Cheering For the Nanny State
Michael Bloomberg, Nanny State, Philosophy, Sara O. Conly, Sarah O. Conly
Bowdoin’s aspiring Platonic Guardian Sara O. Conly recently published a great big book arguing in favor of Nanny State paternalism over Liberty. Not surprisingly, we now find her defending Mayor Bloomberg’s soda ban in the New York Times.
Giving up a little liberty is something we agree to when we agree to live in a democratic society that is governed by laws.
The freedom to buy a really large soda, all in one cup, is something we stand to lose here. For most people, given their desire for health, that results in a net gain. For some people, yes, itâ€™s an absolute loss. Itâ€™s just not much of a loss.
Of course, what people fear is that this is just the beginning: today itâ€™s soda, tomorrow itâ€™s the guy standing behind you making you eat your broccoli, floss your teeth, and watch â€œPBS NewsHourâ€ every day. What this ignores is that successful paternalistic laws are done on the basis of a cost-benefit analysis: if itâ€™s too painful, itâ€™s not a good law. Making these analyses is something the government has the resources to do, just as now it sets automobile construction standards while considering both the need for affordability and the desire for safety.
Do we care so much about our health that we want to be forced to go to aerobics every day and give up all meat, sugar and salt? No. But in this case, itâ€™s some extra soda. Banning a law on the grounds that it might lead to worse laws would mean we could have no laws whatsoever.
In the old days we used to blame people for acting imprudently, and say that since their bad choices were their own fault, they deserved to suffer the consequences. Now we see that these errors arenâ€™t a function of bad character, but of our shared cognitive inheritance. The proper reaction is not blame, but an impulse to help one another.
Thatâ€™s what the government is supposed to do, help us get where we want to go. Itâ€™s not always worth it to intervene, but sometimes, where the costs are small and the benefit is large, it is. Thatâ€™s why we have prescriptions for medicine. And thatâ€™s why, as irritating as it may initially feel, the soda regulation is a good idea. Itâ€™s hard to give up the idea of ourselves as completely rational. We feel as if we lose some dignity. But thatâ€™s the way it is, and thereâ€™s no dignity in clinging to an illusion.
La Conly’s argument (in both her book and this editorial) really boils down to the claim (based on behaviorist social science, no less) that people are incompetent, make bad choices, and have difficulty recognizing their own best interests. Therefore, Conly says these other people over here, the ones who attended Princeton, who have important official titles and positions, know better what is good for everyone; and you ordinary people over there, you dimbulbs and dufi, should be willing to surrender (just a little) liberty here and some other liberty there, when those wiser and better, and more prestigiously and officially placed, than you decide that it is time to lay down the law and tell you what to do, for your own good.
Speaking philosophically, I went to Yale (which outranks Princeton all day long), so I get to point out to Professor Conly that in reality, the behaviorist social sciences prove that our Mandarins, politicians, and experts are just as fallibly human as everyone else, and are also subject to errors produced by biases toward short-term satisfaction and unrealistic optimism, particularly –in their case– optimism about their own capacities, objectivity, and motivations. Platonic Guardians tend to think that they are being disinterested and only trying to maximize everyone’s well being, while all the while they are busily gathering greater powers and control over the lives and fortunes of others to themselves. The best political philosophers are those, like Jefferson and Madison, who recognize the fact that no one enjoys the kind of superiority of perspective which entitles him or her to prescribe to someone else what he ought to do inside his own private sphere of liberty.