1/ Surmising a revised Russian OPLAN. Here are my thoughts on what Russia’s revised operational plan may look like. I have constructed this off what I consider the most logical operational approach that can yield positive results. #UkraineRussianWar #UkraineUnderAttack #strategy pic.twitter.com/UTPYCbRL0u

— Jomini of the West (@JominiW) April 11, 2022

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3/ Still, to understand where this war is going, what conditions military operations will create in the coming weeks, and how they may set conditions for a negotiated settlement an attempt to surmise a logical course of action is necessary.

— Jomini of the West (@JominiW) April 11, 2022

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5/ I have added what I feel are the Ukrainian government’s war aims to this assessment. Essential they are the opposite of Russia’s aims but contain important nuances that offer a “golden bridge” (i.e., making the Russians feel they have achieved a goal).

— Jomini of the West (@JominiW) April 11, 2022

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7/ Russia has already stated that it has achieved the goal of “demilitarization” of the Ukrainian Armed Forces (25 March General Staff press conference). This goal was described as the reduction of Ukraine’s ability to threaten the Donbas & Russia.

— Jomini of the West (@JominiW) April 11, 2022

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9/ The Ukrainian concession of seeking a legally binding international security guarantee backed by the U.S. & major European powers to prevent future Russian aggression in lieu of NATO membership is a golden bridge for Russia’s 2nd war aim.

— Jomini of the West (@JominiW) April 11, 2022

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11/ Russia is still faced with three key questions that need to be answered to properly allocate forces & resources to achieve its goals of Ukrainian acquiescence to its annexation of Crimea and the independence of the Separatist Republics.

— Jomini of the West (@JominiW) April 11, 2022

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13/ The logical conditions Russia must achieve to meet its strategic goals is the ability of the Russian military to seize and hold the entirety of the Donetsk & Luhansk Oblasts, retain territory it occupies in the Zaporizhzhia Oblast, and hold Kherson and its environs.

— Jomini of the West (@JominiW) April 11, 2022

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15/ Terminology. Disruption Zone – Operations in these areas create windows of opportunity that is exploitable in the battle zone by attacking specific components of the enemy’s defensive systems and cause it to breakdown.

— Jomini of the West (@JominiW) April 11, 2022

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17/ Given the operational realities Russia is faced with (i.e., limited manpower, poor morale, fragmented command & control, substandard maintenance, inexperienced leaders, etc.) it’s military can only reasonably focus offensive operations in one area.

— Jomini of the West (@JominiW) April 11, 2022

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19/ This area also constitutes one of the most fortified areas of east Ukraine. Russian attempts to break through the Ukrainian LOC over nearly two months of combat have proven unsuccessful. It is likely that Russian forces now massing near Izium will attempt to outflank the line

— Jomini of the West (@JominiW) April 11, 2022

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21/ The objective of this drive will most likely be decisive geographic point of Pokrovsk which is 79 km NW of Donetsk. The goal is likely to control the main highway from Barvinkove to Pokrovsk & create a cauldron out of north central & NE Donetsk.

— Jomini of the West (@JominiW) April 11, 2022

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23/ The Russians could close the cauldron or leave an opening to encourage Ukrainian troops to flee through, either way Russian forces would be able to clear the most fortified region of Donetsk without having to physically push Ukraine forces out of their positions (in theory).

— Jomini of the West (@JominiW) April 11, 2022

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25/ The second battle zone would be around Kherson. Here we would expect to see priority of forces and resources behind those sent to the Donetsk battle zone to maintain control of this decisive strategic point. A point necessary for a favorable negotiation position.

— Jomini of the West (@JominiW) April 11, 2022

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27/ A second disruption zone will center near the northern border of the Zaporizhzhia Oblast. Like Kharkiv Limited ground assaults and continued air/artillery/missile strikes will fix several maneuver brigades from counterattacks in Donetsk.

— Jomini of the West (@JominiW) April 11, 2022

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29/ Of course all of this is speculation. The Russian approach to operations in the Donbas may be drastically different. They may opt to go head on with prepared Ukrainian defenses, hoping that artillery and air strikes can overcome stiff resistance.

— Jomini of the West (@JominiW) April 11, 2022

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31/ Without reliable data this assessment is really a wild stab in the dark, but it might provide a glimpse of what is in the realm of the possible. One thing I have not discussed is Ukrainian options, this is because there is even less verified Ukrainian data than Russian.

— Jomini of the West (@JominiW) April 11, 2022