Category Archive 'Boumediene v. Bush'
29 Dec 2009
Said Ali al-Shihri aka Sa’id Ali Jabir Al Khathim Al Shihri aka Abu Sayyaf al-Shihr aka Saeed al Shehri aka Said Ali Shari
ABC News reveals that two of the principals behind the failed bombing of Flight 253 were former Guanatanamo detainees, released in the later period of the Bush Administration when that Administration began to buckle under intensive criticism of unlimited detention.
The more prominent released prisoner, Said Ali al-Shihri, was a Saudi al Qaeda travel facilitator, captured with wounds in the leg in Pakistan in the aftermath of the US invasion of Afghanistan, believed to have trained at a Libyan camp north of Kabul.
Since his release, he has been involved in the kidnap-murder of Christian missionary aid workers and the bombing of the US embassy in Yemen.
And a hearty hand of applause for all the counsel and amicus filers in Boumediene v. Bush who started the legal processes leading to the release of these unfortunate victims of American injustice.
Two of the four leaders allegedly behind the al Qaeda plot to blow up a Northwest Airlines passenger jet over Detroit were released by the U.S. from the Guantanamo prison in November, 2007, according to American officials and Department of Defense documents. …
American officials agreed to send the two terrorists from Guantanamo to Saudi Arabia where they entered into an “art therapy rehabilitation program” and were set free, according to U.S. and Saudi officials.
Guantanamo prisoner #333, Muhamad Attik al-Harbi, and prisoner #372, Said Ali Shari, were sent to Saudi Arabia on Nov. 9, 2007, according to the Defense Department log of detainees who were released from American custody. Al-Harbi has since changed his name to Muhamad al-Awfi.
15 Jun 2008
Photoshop commentary by TerrellAfterMath.
13 Jun 2008
Hilzoy thinks she can, but her arguments amount only to extravagant assertions that everyone, everywhere, and at all times, in peace and in war, tra la! has the same judicial rights and the same access to US courts as a US civilian accused of a domestic crime in peacetime residing in the United States.
who has habeas rights? And where do they extend? The court’s answer to the first question (who?) is, basically: everyone has them. (Meaning: if you are detained by the US government, in circumstances in which habeas rights would normally obtain, your lack of citizenship is no obstacle.)
Shooting at US forces in Afghanistan or conspiring in Karachi to arrange attacks on the civilian populations of US cities are the kinds of circumstances in which people normally enjoy the protections of US citizenship and the protection of US courts? Apparently that’s what Hilzoy, a graduate of Princeton, thinks.
if we accept the government’s argument, we would concede that it can legally do what it has tried to do in fact: to create a legal black hole in which it can act outside the law and the Constitution. We cannot do that.
This is, to my mind, the most important holding in the opinion. It defends the separation of powers against an attempt by the Executive to free itself from the constraint of law. That is immensely important.
From Hilzoy’s perspective, there is no legal distinction whatsoever between the United States and foreign soil, no issues of distance, remoteness, or lack of US sovereignty matter. There is no difference between US citizens and aliens, and there is no difference between peace and war.
One expects Hilzoy (and perhaps Justice Kennedy, too) to leap in front of the muzzle of some frontline marine’s rifle, crying out: “Don’t you shoot that chap in the turban (the one firing the AK47)! He’s entitled to counsel, a fair trial, and a full course of appeals before he can be punished. Don’t you go violating his rights, you brute.
13 Jun 2008
In JOHNSON v. EISENTRAGER, 339 U.S. 763 (1950), the Supreme Court ruled:
1. A nonresident enemy alien has no access to our courts in wartime.
2. nonresident enemy aliens, captured and imprisoned abroad, have no right to a writ of habeas corpus in a court of the United States.
3. The Constitution does not confer a right of personal security or an immunity from military trial and punishment upon an alien enemy engaged in the hostile service of a government at war with the United States.
We are here confronted with a decision whose basic premise is that these prisoners are entitled, as a constitutional right, to sue in some court of the United States for a writ of habeas corpus. To support that assumption we must hold that a prisoner of our military authorities is constitutionally entitled to the writ, even though he (a) is an enemy alien; (b) has never been or resided in the United States; (c) was captured outside of our territory and there held in military custody as a prisoner of war; (d) was tried and convicted by a Military Commission sitting outside the United States; (e) for offenses against laws of war committed outside the United States; (f) and is at all times imprisoned outside the United States.
We have pointed out that the privilege of litigation has been extended to aliens, whether friendly or enemy, only because permitting their presence in the country implied [339 U.S. 763, 778] protection. No such basis can be invoked here, for these prisoners at no relevant time were within any territory over which the United States is sovereign, and the scenes of their offense, their capture, their trial and their punishment were all beyond the territorial jurisdiction of any court of the United States. …
To grant the [339 U.S. 763, 779] writ to these prisoners might mean that our army must transport them across the seas for hearing. This would require allocation of shipping space, guarding personnel, billeting and rations. It might also require transportation for whatever witnesses the prisoners desired to call as well as transportation for those necessary to defend legality of the sentence. The writ, since it is held to be a matter of right, would be equally available to enemies during active hostilities as in the present twilight between war and peace. Such trials would hamper the war effort and bring aid and comfort to the enemy. They would diminish the prestige of our commanders, not only with enemies but with wavering neutrals. It would be difficult to devise more effective fettering of a field commander than to allow the very enemies he is ordered to reduce to submission to call him to account in his own civil courts and divert his efforts and attention from the military offensive abroad to the legal defensive at home. Nor is it unlikely that the result of such enemy litigiousness would be a conflict between judicial and military opinion highly comforting to enemies of the United States.
Moreover, we could expect no reciprocity for placing the litigation weapon in unrestrained enemy hands. The right of judicial refuge from military action, which it is proposed to bestow on the enemy, can purchase no equivalent for benefit of our citizen soldiers.
So how does Justice Kennedy arrive at a different conclusion?
at least three factors are relevant in determining the Suspension Clauseâ€™s reach: (1) the detaineesâ€™ citizenship and status and the adequacy of the process through which that status was determined; (2) the nature of the sites where apprehension and then detention took place; and (3) the practical obstacles inherent in resolving the prisonerâ€™s entitlement to the writ. Application of this framework reveals, first, that petitionersâ€™ status is in dispute: They are not American citizens, but deny they are enemy combatants; and although they have been afforded some process in CSRT proceedings, there has been no Eisentragerâ€“style trial by military commission for violations of the laws of war. Second, while the sites of petitionersâ€™ apprehension and detention weigh against finding they have Suspension Clause rights, there are critical differences between Eisentragerâ€™s German prison, circa 1950, and the Guantanamo Naval Station in 2008, given the Governmentâ€™s absolute and indefinite control over the naval station. Third, although the Court is sensitive to the financial and administrative costs of holding the Suspension Clause applicable in a case of military detention abroad, these factors are not dispositive because the Government
presents no credible arguments that the military mission at Guantanamo would be compromised if habeas courts had jurisdiction. The situation in Eisentrager was far different, given the historical context and nature of the militaryâ€™s mission in post-War Germany.
The only readily comprehensible distinctions Justice Kennedy makes are Bush has shilly-shallied around too long. There should have been more timely military trials and the Guantanamo Naval Station is somehow more under “the absolute and definite control” of the US Government than a prison operated by the US Army in Germany in 1950 was, while WWII involved a different historical context and mission, i.e. was the “Good War.”
(1) perhaps has some merit. (2) simply amounts to a rationalization.
Justice Kennedy’s arguments are weak, and they are clearly self-interested. What this is really all about, as in Rasul, is plain Judicial Branch imperialism and overreaching, the refusal to accept limits to jurisdiction or the supremacy of the Executive in time of war.
Justice Kennedy has produced a very irresponsible opinion, which will surely result in the release of some dangerous and fanatical enemies of the United States, very probably leading to further loss of American lives. Members of today’s American intelligentsia, even those sitting on the Supreme Court, are commonly incapable of seeing what was obvious even to the Ancient Romans, who closed the Temple of Janus in time of war to symbolize the fact that inter arma enim silent leges.
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